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The Mediating Effect of Working Memory Impairments on the Relationship between 
Rumination and Distress 
 Conceptualizations of psychopathology provided in various versions of the Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual (DSM) of the American Psychiatric Association are not entirely based on 
empirical research (Cuthbert, 2005; Sanislow et al., 2010; Wakefield, 2016). While each version 
of the DSM has had a fair share of criticism from scholars, the most controversial version of the 
DSM to date is the DSM-5. Although this edition brought forth a multitude of changes (e.g., 
changes to the structure and organization of disorders, additions of new disorders, and changes to 
diagnostic criteria for many disorders), there were still many unresolved issues with the 
classification system (Wakefield, 2016). There appear to be four main concerns with DSM 
conceptualizations: heterogeneity of symptoms within disorders, homogeneity of symptoms 
among disorders (i.e., cross-cutting symptoms), an unclear clinical significance of subthreshold 
symptomology, and substantial comorbidity.   
 DSM-5 conceptualizations treat disorders as discrete entities that can be separated into 
categories (Trull & Durrett, 2005). The presence of mental illness is determined using a list of 
polythetic, observable, attributes and symptoms (usually five to seven). To meet criteria for a 
disorder, an individual must be experiencing a pre-specified number of symptoms (e.g., three out 
of five criteria). Thus, two individuals with the same diagnosis may have little symptom overlap. 
This is problematic, as research has demonstrated that variance in combinations of symptoms 
within categorically distinct disorders is associated with differential responses to treatment 
(Krueger & Bezdjian, 2009). This has lead researchers to debate the extent to which the DSM 
classification scheme is valid for research and practice (Wardenaar & de Jonge, 2013).  
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 In addition to substantial heterogeneity of symptoms within disorders, the same 
observable behaviors may be used to diagnose more than one categorically distinct disorder (e.g., 
panic and avoidance behaviors are used to diagnose both personality disorders and certain 
anxiety disorders; Clark, Watson, & Reynolds, 1995). The DSM-5 partly tried to address this 
issue by including a self-report measure called the DSM-5 Level 1 Cross-Cutting Symptom 
Measure (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). The purpose of the measure is to assess the 
presence of symptoms that occur across a variety of domains of psychopathology in research 
(i.e., cross-cutting symptoms). However, this measure is not meant to be used for the sole 
diagnosis or screening of disorders, which subsequently makes it unclear how clinicians should 
use the information obtained from the measure (Clarke & Kuhl, 2014). In sum, the DSM-5 does 
not provide empirically-sound explanations for why disorders may or may not share features. 
 Using lists of symptoms identified as either present or not present to identify disorders 
within a categorical framework poses additional challenges. Most notably, diagnoses using DSM 
classifications do not provide information regarding the extent to which symptoms exist within 
proximity of a clinically-relevant threshold (Krueger & Bezdjian, 2009). Thus, if an individual is 
presenting with symptoms of psychopathology, but there aren’t enough symptoms present to 
make a diagnosis (e.g., only 3 out of 10), or symptoms are not severe enough to meet criteria 
(e.g., mild impairment associated with presenting symptoms), there may be no diagnosis 
provided. However, information about subthreshold symptoms of psychopathology has long 
been shown to be useful for identifying risks of maintaining and developing psychopathologies 
later in life, and thus may be useful for clinicians in providing treatment (Turner, Beidel, Borden, 
Stanley, and Jacob, 1991; Clark, Watson, and Reynolds, 1995; Judd et al., 1998; Striegerl-Moore 
et al., 2000; Dell’Osso, Allen, & Hollander, 2005; Friederich et al., 2007). The DSM-5 attempted 
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to capture aspects of subthreshold symptomatology by introducing new disorders, subtypes, and 
specifiers (Krueger & Bezdjian, 2009). For example, the DSM-5 introduced an “Anxious 
Distress Specifier” for bipolar and related disorders, which can be used to specify that the 
individual is presenting with anxiety symptoms that aren’t part of the bipolar/related diagnosis, 
but don’t meet criteria for a comorbid anxiety disorder. However, a problem with this approach 
is that additions of new categorical classifications can cause further overlap with other disorders. 
Jones (2012) gives an example of where this was the case in previous versions of the DSM, 
where the adding a “generalized” specifier for individuals with social phobia to signify the 
presence of general social fears overlapped heavily with the diagnostic criteria for avoidant 
personality disorder. Thus, other methods to address subthreshold symptoms of psychopathology 
might be preferable.  
 The DSM also neglects to provide empirically-based rationales for why categorically 
distinct disorders co-occur, which is troublesome since being diagnosed with more than one 
disorder is typical (Widiger & Shea, 1991; Neale & Kendler, 1995; Kim & Eaton, 2015). It is 
surprising that there have not been attempts to address this issue, as there has been a plethora of 
neuroscience and genetics research conducted that provide robust evidence for shared liabilities 
that contribute to psychopathology  (Caspi et al., 2014). For example, research has demonstrated 
using samples of twins that mood and anxiety disorders are influenced by the same genetic 
characteristics (Kendler et al., 1992; Hettema et al., 2005). Further, models that lump mental 
illnesses together, as opposed to splitting them into discrete categories, have shown that many 
disorders share core features and risk factors. These models consistently demonstrate many 
disorders are phenotypically more alike than not (Hyman, 2007). The strong etiological 
relationships between diagnoses has left some researchers to question whether comorbidity is a 
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valid term to use in the context of psychopathology and the DSM because there is little evidence 
available to determine if disorders truly present as distinct entities (First, 2003). However, there 
has not yet been a version of the DSM that integrates these findings into the overall structure and 
organization of disorders.  
 Hierarchical dimensional models of psychopathology can overcome many of the 
shortcomings of DSM conceptualizations (Cuthbert, 2005). Dimensional models can be used to 
display relationships between core features of disorders, shared symptoms of disorders, and 
shared vulnerabilities that contribute to disorder development, onset, and maintenance. By 
focusing on each of these different topics, dimensional models may differ in the extent to which 
they hierarchically organize information in terms of higher-, intermediate-, or lower-order 
constructs. Dimensional models may statistically test relationships among sets of symptoms 
ranging in severity, personality trait dimensions, cognitive risk factors, genetic vulnerabilities, 
and biological markers (Clark, Watson, & Reynolds, 1995). Thus, dimensional models may be 
used to answer questions about heterogeneity of symptoms within disorders, cross-cutting 
symptoms, subthreshold symptomatology, and disorder covariation.  
 One approach researchers have pursued using dimensional models is to map DSM 
symptoms and criteria that would traditionally be diagnosed as present/not present onto a 
continuum of some criteria (e.g., based on severity of impairment). These dimensions of 
symptoms may then be connected to intermediate- and higher-order constructs that represent 
core features of psychopathology (e.g., distress, emotional instability; Krueger, 1999). However, 
these models do not always align well with DSM categorizations. This is in-part because, as 
previously described, categories in the DSM do not account for etiological underpinnings of 
psychopathology or individual differences in subthreshold symptomatology (Krueger & 
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Bezdjian, 2009). Moving from DSM conceptualizations to a dimensional system of classification 
is a monumental task. The process of developing a unitary dimensional model calls for a massive 
overhaul of research to accomplish. Further, it has been suggested that this process should not be 
done haphazardly, but rather research should target and build off specific domains of 
psychopathology where DSM conceptualizations have been consistently demonstrated to be 
lacking (Clark, Watson, & Reynolds, 1995).  
Conceptualizations of Mood and Anxiety Disorders 
 Mood and anxiety disorders are some of the most commonly diagnosed disorders in the 
United States (Conway, Compton, Stintson, & Grant, 2006). It has been estimated that roughly 
50% of individuals meet threshold/subthreshold diagnostic criteria for depression or anxiety. 
Further, it has long been recognized that most people who experience anxiety (up to 85%) also 
demonstrate threshold/subthreshold symptoms of depression, suggesting substantial comorbidity 
(Angst, Merikangas, & Preisig, 1997; Gorman, 1997; Kaufman, 2000). Treatment, research, and 
diagnosis of mood and anxiety disorders can be particularly difficult for clinicians because 
symptoms greatly overlap (Gorman, 1997). 
 Many categorically distinct mood and anxiety disorders can be classified according to the 
same corresponding cognitive impairments, including the tendency to utilize dysfunctional 
cognitive styles of thinking to regulate negative emotions and decreased experiences of positive 
affect (Hofmann, Sawyer, Fang, & Asnaani, 2012). Further, work using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging and electroencephalogram (fMRI and EEG, respectively) has demonstrated 
that mood and anxiety disorders may also be linked by liabilities that underlie brain circuits 
involved in cognition (Nemeroff et al., 2013; Iorfino et al., 2016). However, the DSM-5 does not 
organize disorders based on these findings. Instead, the DSM-5 categorizes disorders based on 
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supporting diagnostic validation and reliability research (Goldberg, Krueger, Andrews, & Hobbs, 
2009). The strong similarities among the organizationally distinct classes of mood and anxiety 
psychopathology in the DSM have lead researchers to question if there should be clear diagnostic 
boundaries between certain disorders. Alternatively, some have instead proposed disorders work 
in tandem and should be thought of in terms of higher-order dimensional constructs that unite 
them (Kotov et al., 2015).    
 Over the last 20 years there has been strong factor-analytic evidence provided to support 
that mood and anxiety psychopathology can be classified under one fundamental dimension, the 
internalizing spectrum (Krueger & Markon, 2006). The internalizing spectrum is comprised of 
disorders categorized by diminished responses to positive affect and excessive responses to 
negative affect. These disorders include major depressive disorder, dysthymic disorder, 
generalized anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, panic disorder, agoraphobia, social 
phobia, and specific phobia. Hierarchical dimensional modeling has shown this spectrum may be 
further divided into two subfactors: a distress component and a fear component (Kessler et al. 
2011). As the names imply, individuals with distress psychopathology tend to internally respond 
to feelings of distress associated with increased negative affect or dampened responses to 
positive affect (e.g., anxious, moody, unhappy), while individuals with fear psychopathology 
tend to internally respond to feelings of fear associated with increased negative affect (e.g., 
panic).  Models investigating the a two-factor structure of psychopathology that utilize the 
internalizing spectrum have been empirically supported using samples of adults (Kreuger & 
Markon, 2006) and children (Lahey et al., 2008). However, there are also areas that dimensional 
models may be improved upon. Much of the work done to develop the two-factor model of 
psychopathology (e.g., Clark & Watson, 1991; Krueger, 1999; Watson, 2005; Krueger & 
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Markon, 2006) has yet to connect many findings from neuroscience research to fundamental 
spectra and subfactors (Vaidyanathan, Patrick, & Cuthbert, 2009).  
 To summarize, there has been a poor integration of empirical research into categorical 
conceptualizations of mood and anxiety psychopathology. Dimensional models of mood and 
anxiety disorders can address many of these issues. However, because these models are 
relatively new there is substantial room for growth in terms of connecting shared biological 
liabilities and observable behaviors to proposed fundamental dimensions. In the context of mood 
and anxiety disorders, research has continually supported that dysfunctional cognitive styles of 
thinking used to regulate emotions (e.g., rumination and worry) are in part responsible for 
depression and anxiety (Hoffmann et al., 2012). Thus, one logical place to begin to build on 
dimensional models of mood and anxiety psychopathology is to investigate what neurologically 
causes these disorders share these tendencies.  
Ruminative Thinking as a Shared Cognitive Symptom of Mood and Anxiety Disorders 
 Rumination is a problematic style of repetitive negative thinking (RNT) that is common 
in mood and anxiety disorders (Onraedt & Koster, 2014). Rumination can be defined as 
maladaptive, recursive thinking about negative emotions and symptoms of distress (Rippere, 
1997). Research has shown rumination maintains symptoms of psychopathology in major 
depressive disorder (MDD; Newby & Moulds, 2012), generalized anxiety disorder (GAD; 
Ruscio, Seitchik, Gentes, Jones, & Hallion, 2011), post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD; 
Spinhoven, Penninx, Krempeniou, van Hemert, & Elzinga, 2015), dysthymic disorder (Kelly, 
Matheson, Ravindran, Merali, & Anisman, 2007), somatization disorders (Brosschot, 2002), and 
eating disorders such as bulimia and binge-eating disorder (Nolen-Hoeksema, Stice, Wade, & 
Bohon, 2007).  
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 Rumination has also been studied in relation to core constructs that make up the basis of 
the internalizing spectrum proposed by researchers such as Krueger & Markon (2006). Of the 
most widely studied is the relationship between rumination and increased experiences of 
negative affect (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). Negative affect can be defined as a disposition to 
experience negative emotional states (Watson & Clark, 1984).  For instance, feelings of negative 
affect such as embarrassment, sadness, helplessness, stress, and anger have all been 
demonstrated to be positively associated with the tendency to engage in rumination (Thomsen, 
2006). As such, responses to negative affect are central to the discussion of how ruminative 
thinking influences mood and anxiety psychopathology.  
 Strong relationships between negative affect and rumination has lead researchers to ask if 
engaging in rumination increases negative affect, or if increases in negative affect are responsible 
for inciting rumination. Research has suggested that rumination results from the continual 
devotion of cognitive resources towards attending to and maintaining negative thoughts and 
emotions in working memory (Lissnyder, Koster, & Raedt, 2011). Further, the relationship 
between negative affect and rumination has been demonstrated to be reciprocal, where increased 
ruminative thinking results in increased negative affect (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013).  
 Early work by Duval and Wicklund (1972) proposed the Theory of Self-Awareness to 
explain the relationship between self-focused attention (SFA) and affective states. This theory 
posits that when a person is self-aware (i.e., thinking about their emotions or state of being), an 
individual’s current state in a specific domain is compared with their standard or ideal state for 
that domain. From this framework, it is proposed that positive affect is experienced if the current 
state is better than the standard, while negative affect is experienced if the current state falls 
below the standard. Similarly, Carver and Scheier (1998) proposed that negative affect occurs 
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from self-regulatory processes that allow an individual to identify when slow progress is made 
towards reducing the difference between the current state and the standard state. In sum, these 
theories posit that when an individual engages in rumination, the individual compares their ideal 
state to the current or past state, recognizes that the states are incongruent (and ruminates about 
why this is the case), experiences negative affect because of ruminative thinking, and thus 
ruminates more about their negative emotions, creating additional negative emotions. This 
process can be thought of as a downward-spiraling loop (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991).  
 Supporting that there is a reciprocal relationship between ruminative thinking and 
negative affect, Nolen-Hoeksema (1991) proposed that for individuals with depression, 
ruminative SFA results in prolonged depressive states because rumination enhances the effects of 
negative affect on cognitive processes. Many researchers suggest that in anxiety and related 
disorders, ruminative thinking seems to increase negative affect by way of continual devotion of 
cognitive resources towards negative content (Watson, Kotov, & Gamez, 2006). This idea has 
lead researchers to explore the extent to which deficits in cognitive functioning may contribute to 
an individual's inability to avoid or cease ruminative thinking.  
Cognitive Vulnerabilities Associated with Rumination and Distress Psychopathology 
 A discussion of information processing is key to understanding how the rumination cycle 
occurs. Rumination can be described as a style of information processing centered on recurrent 
thoughts and ideas (Monnart, Korneich, Verbanck, & Campanella, 2016). However, it is well 
established that an individual’s information processing resources are limited, such that an 
individual may only attend to and hold in working memory a certain amount of information 
present in the environment at any given time (Bargh, 1982).  
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 Working memory (WM) has been defined as the temporary limited-capacity information 
storage system that provides a workspace for information to be processed, during which 
information may be temporarily maintained and manipulated (Baddeley, Banse, & Huang, 2012). 
Further, information held in this workspace reflects an individual’s focus of attention and 
representations of awareness (Joorman & Quinn, 2014). Executive functions carried out by WM 
are responsible for various distinct, but related control processes that select what information 
may enter and remain in working memory (Joormann, Levens, & Gotlib,  2011). For example, 
executive functions are responsible for integrating processes that ignore irrelevant information 
(inhibition), altering and maintaining representations of information (updating), and switching 
attention between active representations (shifting; Carriedo, Corral, Montoro, & Herrero, 2016; 
Nee et al., 2012). These processes all require substantial cognitive resources that are used up 
when a person engages in rumination (Flores Jr. & Berimbau, 2016).  
 Rumination is thought to be distinctively associated with poor working memory 
performance (Owens, Koster, & Derakshan, 2012). For example, work by Curci, Lanciano, 
Soleti, and Rimé (2013) found that ruminative processes drain working memory (WM) resources 
by dividing attention, leading to decreases in WM performance. Following this framework, one 
would infer that during a state of rumination an individual would have less working memory 
resources available, and as a result would perform poorly on tasks of executive functioning due 
to a lack of resources. Thus, it is believed the inability to prevent intrusive, negative thoughts 
from entering working memory (i.e., inhibition) and the inability to replace these thoughts (i.e., 
update working memory) contributes to ongoing ruminative thought (Joorman, 2006). 
 In keeping with the notion that rumination is associated with negative emotional 
experiences, a myriad of research has established that trait ruminators show biases towards 
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processing negative stimuli. Specifically, it has been demonstrated that individual’s high in trait 
rumination devote more neural resources when processing negative information compared to 
neutral or positive information (Judah, Grant, & Carlisle, 2016; Cooney, Joorman, Eugene, 
Dennis, & Gotlib, 2010). Similarly, many studies have also shown that individuals with distress 
psychopathologies have biases for maintaining negative information over other neutral or 
positive information held in working memory (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). For example, a study 
conducted by Levens & Gotlib (2010) found that depressed individuals updated sad material in 
working memory faster than non-depressed individuals. Similar findings have been replicated for 
individuals with trait anxiety, where increased anxiety was shown to be associated with biased 
working memory updating for negative information (Visu-Petra, Miclea, & Visu-Petra, 2013).  
 The results from these studies suggest that biases for maintaining negative information in 
working memory is likely responsible for the maintenance of ruminative thought cycles in 
distress psychopathology (Onraedt & Koster, 2014). More specifically, if a person is unable to 
ignore or orient attention away from negative information held in working memory and devote 
resources to update and incorporate new, more neutral or positive information, then prolonged 
exposure to negative contents may result in increased negative affect, resulting in further 
ruminative thought (Koster, Lissnyder, Derakshan, & Raedt, 2011). However, one criticism that 
has been made of the aforementioned research is that researchers typically only use behavioral 
measures to assess working memory functioning. This is problematic, as it makes it is impossible 
to develop nuanced interpretations regarding how deficits in executive functioning relate to 
ruminative thinking. Specifically, it is impossible to distinguish between early and late processes 
involved in executive functioning (e.g., attentional shifting vs. actively manipulating 
information) using reaction time data. This is because research conducted using reaction time as 
13 
UPDATING, RUMINATION, AND DISTRESS 
a proxy for attention not only captures attentional processes, but also includes error resulting 
from non-attentional processes (Judah, Grant, & Carlisle, 2016). 
Measuring Cognitive Vulnerabilities. Electroencephalogram (EEG) methodologies 
provide a more desirable way to obtain a measure of executive functioning compared to 
behavioral measures. This is because neurophysiological techniques can provide insight into 
temporal aspects of processing that behavioral equivalents do not. EEG researchers often opt to 
use event-related potential (ERP) methodology because of the ability to obtain a time-locked 
measure of neural activity to an external stimulus. ERPs measure summated postsynaptic 
potentials produced by synchronous firing of cortical pyramidal neurons. The summated voltages 
produced throughout the brain are represented by ERP waveforms. ERPs can be distinguished by 
timing, morphology, and scalp topography in response to experimental manipulations (Hajcak, 
MacNamara, & Olvet, 2010). Further, ERPs can be used to distinguished between early and late 
process, including processing occurring within the first 100 milliseconds of seeing a stimulus 
(Sur & Sinha, 2009). This makes ERPs useful for quantifying specific executive functions 
carried out in working memory (Kessel et al. 2016). For example, researchers have suggested 
that the P300 ERP waveform may be used to measure neural resource allocation during working 
memory updating, which occurs approximately 250-450 ms after the stimulus presentation 
(Polich, 2007). In these studies, greater P300 amplitudes correspond to greater resource 
expenditures during updating (Donchin and Coles, 1988; Kessel et al., 2016). Thus, the P300 
may be used to obtain a measure of resource allocation during working memory updating in 
response to emotional stimuli.  
 Kessel and colleagues (2016) demonstrated how a measure of working memory updating 
can be obtained using EEG/ERP methodology. Specifically, the researchers had participants 
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complete an N-back task while EEG data was collected. During N-back tasks, participants are 
rapidly shown a series of stimuli (e.g., words, pictures). As participants are shown stimuli from 
the series, participants are asked to decide if a target stimulus on the screen matches previously 
shown targets that appeared N steps prior (e.g., a 3-Back task means participants have to recall 
stimuli that appeared 3 steps prior). This type of task requires participants to add and subtract 
information from working memory, as participants must attend to, update, and store the 
information so that it may later be retrieved for decisions (Desnoyers & Arpin-Cribbie, 2015). 
The experimental design utilized by Kessel and colleagues (2016) poses a way to corroborate 
findings from behavioral studies regarding relationships between rumination, distress 
psychopathology, and working memory updating. 
The Current Study 
 Conceptualizations of mood and anxiety psychopathology in the DSM do not adequately 
address findings from neuroscience and genetics research. Additionally, high comorbidity of 
disorders is not addressed. Dimensional models may be used to address these shortcomings by 
statistically testing relationships between disorders and related phenomena. However, few 
studies using dimensional models have yet incorporated findings from neuroscience and genetics 
research.  
 The present project aimed to contribute to dimensional models of psychopathology by 
connecting styles of thinking typical for mood and anxiety disorders to deficits in brain 
functioning. Specifically, no research was found that adequately investigated the possibility that 
biases in working memory updating for negative information maintain ruminative thinking for 
those residing on the lower, middle, and upper ends of the distress dimension. Instead, much 
research that has investigated relationships between rumination, executive functioning, and 
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distress psychopathology has done so in the context of DSM criteria for categories of disorders 
(e.g., groups with individuals being having present/not present depression or anxiety alone; see 
Joormann, Levens, & Gotlib, 2011; Joorman and Gotlib, 2008; Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). This 
kind of approach does not allow for any information to be obtained regarding relationships 
between dimensions of psychopathology and executive functioning. However, despite this, the 
findings from a variety of studies looking at individual disorders and trait rumination implicate 
similar deficits in executive functioning are responsible (Joorman, Levens, & Gotlib, 2011; 
Joorman & Gotlib, 2008; Lee Pe, Raes, & Kuppens, 2013; Levens & Gotlib, 2010; Whitmer & 
Gotlib, 2013; Visu-Petra, Miclea, & Visu-Petra, 2013).  
 It was hypothesized that the reason individuals prone to experience distress share the 
tendency to ruminate is because of difficulties updating contents of working memory. This was 
expected because research has suggested individuals with various distress psychopathologies 
have issues with “sticky thoughts,” where they are unable to devote resources to maintain 
positive or neutral information in working memory due to biases for maintaining negative 
information (Joormann, Levens, & Gotlib, 2011). Further, other research has demonstrated that 
emotional distress is associated with poorer working memory functioning in non-clinical 
populations (Stout and Rokke, 2008). These findings further support the importance of 
accounting for subthreshold psychopathology in dimensional models. This can be achieved by 
using continuous measures of functioning.  
 To investigate relationships between working memory updating, distress, and rumination,  
EEG was used to obtain a measure of working memory updating. The present study used an N-
back paradigm, which was modeled after the 3-back task used by Kessel and colleagues (2016). 
To obtain a measure of distress psychopathology, participants were asked to complete the 
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MMPI-2-RF (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2008/2011). This measure was selected as previous 
research has demonstrated that the Restructured Clinical scales of the MMPI-2-RF, specifically 
RCd (Demoralization), RC7 (Dysfunctional Negative Emotions), and RC2 (Low Positive 
Emotions) are the best predictors of the distress subdimension among all MMPI-2-RF subscales 
(Lee, Sellbom, and Hopwood, In Press). Participants tendency to ruminate was measured using a 
shortened form of the Ruminative Response Scale (RRS; McEvoy & Brans, 2013) These 
measures both provide continuous estimates of functioning, thus allowing for the severity of 
symptomology to be incorporated into the research.  
 The goal of this study was to test the hypothesis that the relationship between features of 
distress psychopathology and ruminative thinking can be explained by overarching biases for 
maintaining negative information in working memory. This area of research is important, as it 
may provide implications for dimensional conceptualizations of internalizing psychopathology. 
Specifically, the present study aimed to incorporate findings from neuroscience research into 
dimensional models of distress disorders. Additionally, the current study aimed to provide a 
means to address issues associated with conceptualizing subthreshold/threshold psychopathology 
by using a dimensional approach. This was accomplished by using continuous measures of 
functioning, which allowed individual differences to be fully captured and incorporated into the 
model.  
Method 
Participants 
 Pre-screen data were collected from 271 undergraduate participants enrolled in courses at 
a Midwestern University across the Fall 2017 and Spring 2018 semesters. Participants completed 
a short online survey that assessed medical health, tendencies to engage in ruminative thinking, 
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and a measure of trait hopelessness. The purpose of administering the pre-screen was to identify 
participants with greater tendencies to ruminate and potentially clinically-relevant features of 
distress psychopathology (i.e., hopelessness). The pre-screen criteria required that participants 
had an average score on the shortened Ruminative Response Scale greater than or equal to two 
and total score on the Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS) greater than or equal to six. This cutoff 
was selected for the BHS because scores ranging between 4-8 are used to indicate the presence 
of mild impairment (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 1974). Thus, all participants that were 
pre-screened should have demonstrated, at minimum, mild distress. However, these criteria were 
waived before the start of data collection during the Spring 2018 semester due to low recruitment 
and study completion rates during the Fall semester. Specifically, 71 out of 151 participants that 
completed the pre-screen were invited to complete the study during the Fall semester based on 
the pre-screening criteria. Of the 71 invited participants, 15 participants came into the lab to 
complete the study. Thus, the recruitment rate during the Fall semester was 21.2%. However, of 
the 15 participants recruited during the Fall semester, 6 had unusable EEG data because of 
inaccurate trigger codes on the working memory task. The trigger codes are important because 
they are used to time-lock the responses to the stimuli (i.e., words), and without them there was 
no way to obtain P300 values for the categories of words. This left 9 participants sampled during 
the Fall semester that had complete, usable data.  
 A decision was made to open the study to all participants during the Spring 2018 
semester to attempt to reach the desired sample size of 30. During the Spring semester, 120 
participants completed the pre-screen and were invited to complete the laboratory study. Of these  
participants, 13 came into the lab to complete the study. Thus, the recruitment rate during the 
Spring semester was  10.8%. However, of these 13 individuals, 2 decided they did not want to be 
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hooked up to the EEG and left the study before data were collected. Another 2 individuals were 
unable to complete the EEG task because of technical issues associated with connecting the EEG 
electrodes to the scalp. The left 9 participants that completed both the MMPI-2-RF and the 
working memory task during the Spring semester. Additionally, 1 participant collected during 
the Spring semester had unusable EEG data because of excessive interference that caused a large 
majority of trials to be rejected during data cleaning (more than 50%). This left 8 participants 
sampled during the Spring semester with complete, usable data.  
 To summarize, of the 271 participants who completed to pre-screen, a total of 17 
participants out of 191 invited participants (totaled across both semesters) completed the MMPI-
2-RF and the working memory task. Of the 17 participants with complete data, 2 participants 
sampled during the Fall semester were found to have invalid MMPI-2-RF profiles, leaving 15 
total participants for complete analyses (mean age = 19.13, SD = .99). See Table 1 below for 
further details regarding why these participants profiles were invalid. Additionally, the invalid 
profiles’ RCd scores are presented. Of the 15 participants with complete and valid data (7 
sampled during the Fall, 8 sampled during the Spring), 6 identified as male and 9 as female. The 
race/ethnicity break-down for these participants was 93.3% White and 6.7% Asian. All 
participants who completed the pre-screen received compensation in the form of credit for an 
introductory course requirement. Individuals who came into the lab received additional credits 
for an introductory course requirement and were also entered into a drawing for a gift card.  
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Table 1 
Summary of MMPI-2-RF Profiles  
MMPI-2-RF Scale Valid Profiles (N = 15) Invalid Profile 1 Invalid Profile 2 
 Mean (SD) Min - Max   
CNS** 1.93 (2.25) 0 – 6 24* 16* 
VRIN* 55.07 (11.04) 39 - 73 43.50 48.34 
TRIN* 56.60 (6.37) 50 - 73 72.58 57.48 
F* 64.07 (21.90) 42 – 106  60.55 92.40 
Fp* 59.93 (16.48) 42 - 94 67.99 76.52 
Fs** 2.60 (2.64) 0 – 8  2 6 
FBS* 59.33 (17.95) 39 – 96  67.05 79.94 
RBS* 63.73 (18.25) 33 - 92 79.75 83.97 
L 50.94 (10.22)  37.29 – 66.43 42.34 37.39 
K 43.19 (10.44) 31.29 – 65.60  27.86 31.29 
RCd** 10.67 (9.37) 0 – 24 16 21 
Note: Scale CNS is a measure of nonresponding (i.e., the total number of items missing). 
Scale VRIN is a measure of random responding. Scale TRIN is a measure of acquiescent 
responding. Scales F, Fp, Fs, FBS, and RBS are measures of overreporting. Scales L and 
K are measures of underreporting. Scale RCd is a measure of demoralization.Scales 
marked by * are rounded/truncated scores. Scales marked by ** are raw scores. Scales 
that are not marked with an asterisk are unrounded/untruncated scores. Individual profile 
scores for each invalid profile marked by * were reasons why the individual profile was 
marked invalid.  
Materials 
 Shortened Ruminative Response Scale. The Ruminative Response Scale (RRS) is used 
to measure individual differences in the tendency to engage in ruminative thinking during a 
period of depressed mood (i.e., differences in trait rumination; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1991). Participants are asked to rate 22 items that assess the individual’s tendency to engage in 
rumination using a four-point scale ranging from almost never (1) to almost always (4). For 
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example, one item asks participants to rate how often they “Think ‘Why can’t I handle things 
better?’”  
 Research using the RRS proposed the measure to consist of three factors: brooding, 
reflection, and depression (Treynor et al. 2004). Brooding is defined as the passive comparison 
between an individual’s current and ideal state, (e.g., “How often do you think ‘Why do I always 
react this way?’”). Reflection is defined as deliberate problem-solving with the intent to 
overcome low mood, (e.g., “How often do you write down what you are thinking about and 
analyze it?”). The last factor, depression, is composed of items that overlap with symptoms of 
depression, (e.g., “How often do you think about your feelings of fatigue and achiness?”).  
Since its initial development, research has been done to alter the RRS to remove a confound 
between rumination and specific symptoms of depression. To do this, items were removed that 
fit under the depression factor, resulting in a ten-item measure of rumination (Segerstrom et al. 
2000; Treynor et al. 2004). To complement these changes, McEvoy & Brans (2013) altered the 
measures instructions and removed all remaining questions in the 10-item measure that 
mentioned the word depression. This resulted in a seven-item measure of rumination. Thus, the 
shortened 7-item measure provides a mean to assess rumination for all individuals, regardless if 
they have experienced depressed mood or not. The current study used McEvoy & Brans (2013) 
shortened Ruminative Response Scale. Exact instructions and questions used are available in 
Appendix A. Tendencies to ruminate were operationalized using participants’ average RRS 
scores. The average score consists of the sum of the seven items divided by the total number of 
items, where higher scores represent a greater tendency to ruminate. Scores may range from one 
to four. Past research has not provided reliability information for this measure; however, the 
current study obtained an estimate of internal consistency using the 271 pre-screened 
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participants, which suggested that scale demonstrates acceptable reliability, α = .81. A measure 
of internal consistency based on the sample of 15 participants is provided in Table 2 at the 
beginning of the results section.  
Beck Hopelessness Scale. The Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS) is a 20-item self-report 
measure used to quantify current levels of hopelessness (Beck, Weissman, Lester, & Trexler, 
1974). The scale includes 11 negatively worded items (e.g., "My future seems dark to me) and 9 
positively worded items (e.g., I look forward to the future with hope and optimism").  Each item 
is presented in a true-false response format. Scores obtained on this inventory can range from 0-
20, with larger scores indicating greater hopeless. In addition to being used to pre-screen 
participants, this measure was used to obtain an estimate of convergent validity for the 
demoralization scale. An estimate of internal consistency for the present sample is provided in 
Table 2 at the beginning of the results section.  
 Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2-Restructured Format. The 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2-Restructured Format (MMPI-2-RF) is a 338 
true-false measure commonly used to measure personality and psychopathology (Ben-Porath & 
Tellegen, 2008/2011). The total measure is composed of 51 scales; however, the current study 
will focus on scores obtained for the Restructured Clinical (RC) scales. These scales were 
selected for the current study as research has suggested that RCd (Demoralization), RC7 
(Dysfunctional Negative Emotions), and RC2 (Low Positive Emotions) are strong predictors of 
distress disorders (Lee, Sellbom, and Hopwood, In Press). Specifically, RCd scores will be used 
to obtain a measure of distress psychopathology, as demoralization has been repeatedly 
suggested to be a defining feature of distress psychopathology (Sansone & Sansone, 2010). The 
Restructured Clinical Scales have been demonstrated to show acceptable reliability and validity 
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in clinical and non-clinical samples (Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2008). A measure of internal 
consistency for the RCd scale is provided in Table 2 at the beginning of the results section.  
 3-Back task. The proposed study measured individual differences in working memory 
updating using an adapted 3-back task modeled after Kessel and colleagues (2016). Participants 
were shown a series of negative and neutral words. For each word presented in the series, 
participants were instructed to indicate (Y/N) if the target word matched the word presented 
three words back. Each word in the series was presented individually for 500 ms, followed by a 
2000 ms delay before another word was presented. Stimuli used in this task consisted of four 
distinct types: negative match, negative non-match, neutral match, and neutral non-match. There 
were 108 trials where targets matched the word presented 3 words back (54 negative matches 
and 54 neutral matches). There were 324 trials where targets did not match the word presented 3 
words back (162 negative non-matches and 162 neutral non-matches). Trial types were equally 
presented across six separate blocks. Blocks were separated by three-minute breaks. P300 ERP 
activity in response to negative matching and neutral matching trials were compared to measure 
updating biases for emotional material. For a visual representation of this task, see Figure 1.  
 Psychophysiological recording, data reduction, and analysis. Continuous EEG 
activity was recorded using the Biosemi ActiveTwo system. The EEG was collected at a 
sampling rate of 1024 Hz. Recordings were taken using 72 scalp electrodes and acquired with an 
online reference unique to the ActiveTwo system. Using the amplifier, electrodes were 
referenced to a virtual ground point. Electrooculogram was be recorded using two auxiliary 
electrodes; one was placed 1 cm below the eye, and the other 1 cm lateral to the eye. Electrode 
impedances were kept below 10 kOhms.  
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 MatLab (2014) was used for offline analysis. Data were referenced offline to the average 
mastoids and band-pass filtered from .5 – 55 Hz using Butterworth zero phase filters. The signal 
was segmented from -200 to 600 ms relative to feedback onset. Correction for eye movements 
and blinks was performed using Independent Component Analysis (see Onton, Westerfield, 
Townsend, & Makeig (2006) for a full review). Succinctly, ICA employs a series of algorithms 
that separate EEG signals into independent components associated with distinct cortical activity 
over time.  Individual channels were examined for artifacts, removed pre-ICA, and interpolated 
after ICA. ERPs were averaged separately for the two overarching categories of words (negative 
and neutral). ERPs were scored using time-window averages at representative electrodes. 
Specifically, the P300 was analyzed based on a visual inspection of average peaks occurring 
between 250-650 ms for all participants at locations Fz, Cz, and Pz. 
Procedure  
 All participants were first asked to provide informed consent to participate in the research 
via an online survey. Consenting participants then completed a pre-screen that included the 
shortened RRS, the BHS, and a health-screen survey. Afterwards, participants were e-mailed to 
set up a time and date to complete to lab study. Once in the lab, participants completed a second 
informed consent form. Next, participants received verbal instructions for the study from a 
research assistant to complete a measure of psychological functioning (i.e., the MMPI-2-RF). 
Afterwards, participants completed a 3-back task while EEG data were collected. The entire lab 
study was completed in under two hours. The pre-screen survey took ten minutes or less.  
Data Analysis  
 A mediational analysis was conducted to examine if the relationship between scores on 
the RRS and MMPI-2-RF RCd scale were mediated by the difference in P300 amplitudes for 
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negative words compared to neutral words. To investigate potential differences in P300 
amplitudes across the three locations (Fz, Cz, and Pz), a repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted. The results from this test supported there were not differences in amplitudes across 
locations. Thus, P300 difference scores for each location were averaged, and scalp location was 
not considered a variable in the analysis. Assumptions of mediation were also investigated. 
Mediational analysis was selected because it examines whether a relationship between two 
variables can be explained by some intervening variable. The SPSS macro PROCESS was used 
to run a series of linear regressions used to determine if mediation is present (see Hayes, 
2012/2013 for further description of PROCESS). For this analysis scores on the MMPI-2-RF 
demoralization scale served as the criterion variable, scores on the shortened Ruminative 
Response Scale served as the predictor variable, and averaged differences between P300 
amplitudes for negative compared to neutral words served as the mediating variable.  
 Exploratory Analyses. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to test for differences among 
participants collected during the Fall and Spring semesters on each self-report variable. This 
analysis was conducted to investigate the impact waiving the pre-screening criteria may have had 
on the results.  
 Pearson’s correlation coefficients were used to demonstrate convergent validity of the 
demoralization measure. Specifically, relationships between demoralization and self-reported 
hopelessness are presented. Pearson’s correlation coefficients were also used to investigate the 
relationship between behavioral and EEG data collected during the N-back task. Specifically, 
relationships between participants’ average accuracy for trials, average reaction time, and 
differences in P300 amplitudes for negative to neutral words are presented.  
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Results 
Table 2 
Summary of Descriptive Statistics of Variables (N = 15) 
Measure   M (SD) Min – Max Alpha Skewness Kurtosis 
Rumination  2.30 (.78) 1.14 – 4.00 .85 .70 .105 
Demoralization1  10.67 (9.37) 0 - 24 .97 .20 -1.76 
P300  .71 (1.15) -1.21 – 3.01 -  .16 -.36 
Hopelessness  6.93 (6.10) 0 - 20 .73 1.24 1.42 
N-back RT  707.00 (89.54) 565.23 – 869.99 - .04 -.90 
N-back Accuracy  71.42 (6.58) 55.62 – 79.20 - -.92 .81 
Note: The above table displays descriptive statistics for all measures used in the study. The 
results support that the measures of rumination and demoralization were sufficiently reliable. 
1Raw scores are presented for the present data but may be converted into t-scores for further 
clinical interpretations.  
Exploratory Analyses 
 A one-way ANOVA was conducted to investigate if there were differences between the 
participants recruited during the Fall and Spring semesters on the measures of trait rumination 
and demoralization. Results from these analyses suggested that participants recruited during the 
Fall semester (M = 2.73, SD = .68) had significantly higher scores on the RRS than those 
sampled during the Spring semester (M = 1.93, SD = .70), F(1,13) = 5.10, p < .05, partial eta-
squared = .28. Participants did not significantly differ on demoralization scores, F(1,13) = 3.54, p 
= .08, partial eta-squared = .21. Specifically, participants sampled during the Fall had an average 
demoralization score of 15.13, SD = 7.98, while participants sampled during the Spring had an 
average demoralization score of 6.75, SD = 9.14. As such, while the means for these groups 
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appear quite different, there was a large amount of variance in scores within groups, in addition 
to a small sample size, that likely lead to the non-significant finding.  
 There was a significant, positive correlation between demoralization and hopelessness, r 
= .70, p < .004 (See Table 3 below). There was also a significant, positive correlation between 
trait rumination and hopelessness, r = .76, p < .001. Thus, it appears that the criteria used for the 
pre-screening measure aligned well with the selected measures of distress and rumination.   
Table 3 
Summary of Correlations Among Variables (N = 15) 
Measure  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Rumination (1)  1 .85*** .32 .76*** .05 .16 
Demoralization (2)  1 .08 .70** -.05 .06 
P300 (3)         1 .36 .30 .27 
Hopelessness (4)    1 .03 -.03 
N-back RT (5)     1 .60* 
N-back Accuracy (6)      1 
Note: The above table displays results from a correlation analysis investigating relationships 
between rumination, demoralization, P300 amplitude difference scores that were averaged across 
three locations, participants total score on the Beck Hopelessness Scale (BHS), participants’ 
average reaction time, and participants’ average accuracy score. 
p < .001***, p < .005**, p < .05* 
Repeated Measures ANOVA 
 A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to test for differences in P300 amplitudes 
across frontal, central, and parietal locations. The results from this test suggested there were no 
differences in amplitudes across locations, F(2, 13) =  1.25, p = .30, partial eta squared = .08. 
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Thus, differences in P300 amplitudes to negative compared to neutral words were averaged 
across the three locations. A summary of descriptive statistics all variables is located in Table 2.  
Assumptions of Multicollinearity 
 Assumptions of linearity and multicollinearity were investigated using scatter-plots and 
results from tests of Pearson’s product-moment correlation coefficient. Scatter-plots depicting 
relationships between independent variables (rumination and the average P300 difference scores) 
and the dependent variable (demoralization) suggested that there appeared to be linear 
relationships between the dependent variable and independent variables. The results from this 
analysis suggest that the assumption of multicollinearity was not violated, as none of 
independent variables used in the mediation were related. Specifically, the largest correlation 
between any two independent variables used in the mediation (i.e., rumination and working 
memory updating) was moderate (r = .32; see Table 3). 
Independence 
 The assumption of independence was not met, as the current sample was a convenience 
sample. This suggests that the participants data may in some way be connected (i.e., dependent). 
This is problematic because it can cause results to be biased in one direction or another, as 
opposed to creating a random distribution of scores on each measure collected.    
Normality 
 Assumptions of normality for linear regression were investigated using a histogram of 
residuals (See Figure 2). The histogram indicates that normality was not a major concern for the 
sample, as values appeared to generally follow the normal distribution curve. Histograms 
showing the distributions for the variables rumination, demoralization, and average P300 
difference scores are presented in Figure 3.  
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Homoscedasticity  
 Assumptions of homoscedasticity (i.e., equal variances of residuals) were investigated 
using a series of residual plots (See Figure 4). Specifically, a plot of standardized residuals and 
the dependent variable (demoralization) revealed no issues with assumptions of 
homoscedasticity, as values were varied across the horizontal axis and did not appear to produce 
any pattern. A plot of standardized residuals and standardized predicted values further confirmed 
this.  
Mediation Analysis  
 In order to test for mediation, four relationships must be tested (Baron and Kenny, 1986). 
First, there must be a significant relationship between the independent variable (rumination) and 
the dependent variable (demoralization). Second, there must be a significant relationship 
between the independent variable (rumination) and the mediating variable (working memory 
updating). Third, there must be a relationship between the mediating variable (working memory 
updating) and the dependent variable (demoralization) when controlling for the independent 
variable (rumination). Finally, there should not be a relationship between the independent 
variable (rumination) and the dependent variable (demoralization) when controlling for the 
mediating variable (working memory updating). If the first three steps are present, but the fourth 
step is not, then partial mediation has occurred. In terms of effects, if there were a significant 
relationship between the independent variable and dependent variable, then a direct effect is 
present. If there were a significant relationship between the mediating variable and the dependent 
variable when controlling for the independent variable, then an indirect effect is present (i.e., the 
effect of the independent variable on the dependent variable can be completely transmitted 
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through the mediator). Finally, the total effect is the sum of the direct and indirect effects. Thus, 
if one of these effects is significant, it is possible to also have a significant total effect.  
 The results from this analysis suggest that while ignoring the mediator (P300 
amplitudes), there was a significant relationship between the independent variable (rumination) 
and the dependent variable (demoralization), b = 10.12, t(13) = 5.74, p < .001, 95% CI = (6.31, 
13.93). However, the relationship between the independent variable (rumination) and the 
mediating variable (P300 amplitudes) was not significant, b = .47, t(13) = 1.21, p = .25, 95% CI 
= (-.37, 1.30). When controlling for the independent variable (rumination) the mediator (P300 
amplitudes) did not significantly predict the dependent variable (demoralization), b = -1.75, t(13) 
= -1.43, p = .18, 95% CI = (-4.40, 91) . When controlling for the mediator (P300 amplitudes) the 
independent variable (rumination) significantly predicted the dependent variable 
(demoralization), b = 10.94, t(13) = 6.11, p < .001, 95% CI = (7.04, 14.84). Thus, because the 
independent variable (rumination) and the mediator were not related, and the mediator did not 
out-predict the independent variable, mediation did not occur. As a result, there was a significant 
total and direct effect due to the strong relationship between rumination and demoralization, but 
there was not a significant indirect effect.  A summary of results from the mediational analysis is 
presented in Table 4 below.  
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Table 4 
Summary of Indirect, Total, and Direct Effects of Rumination on Demoralization (N = 15) 
Effect Type    Effect Std. Error t 95% CI 
Total Effect   10.12** 1.76 5.74 [6.31, 13.93] 
Direct Effect   10.94** 1.79 6.11 [7.04, 14.84] 
Indirect Effect   -0.09 - -  [-3.80, 1.39] 
Note: The above table displays results from the mediation analysis. The results support that there 
was a significant direct and total effect of rumination on demoralization.  
p < .001** 
Discussion 
 Past research has taken a piecemeal approach to connecting rumination, distress 
psychopathology, and working memory updating. However, dimensional models pose an 
opportunity to connect and make sense of these findings. Specifically, past literature has 
demonstrated that biases for maintaining negative over neutral or positive information in 
working memory contribute to ruminative thinking (Joorman, 2006). Other work has 
demonstrated similar biases for updating negative information are associated with maintenance 
of various mood and anxiety disorders (Whitmer & Gotlib, 2013). However, no work was found 
that connected these findings into a cohesive model.  
Mediation Results 
 Results from the study did not support the hypothesis that working memory updating 
would mediate the relationship between rumination and distress psychopathology. Although the 
mediation findings provided support for previous research suggesting that rumination is strongly 
associated with distress psychopathology, no meaningful, predictive relationships were found 
between working memory updating for negative compared to neutral information and distress 
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psychopathology or rumination. This was further supported by the findings that the direct and 
total effects were significant, but the indirect effect of rumination on demoralization was not.   
Correlations among variables suggested that while demoralization and differences in P300 
amplitudes for negative compared to neutral words were not related, the correlation between 
rumination and P300 amplitudes was moderately sized (r = .32; see Cohen, 1988 for guidelines 
to interpreting correlations). This correlation was positive, suggesting that as tendencies to 
ruminate increased, as did the average difference in P300 amplitudes between negative and 
neutral words. Thus, rumination is likely associated with greater resource allocation towards 
processing negative compared to neutral stimuli. However, it is worthwhile to note that this 
correlation was not found to be significant, likely due to the small sample size.  
 Per the results from the mediation analysis, it appears that working memory updating is 
not associated with rumination and experiences of distress. Some past research has suggested 
that alternative executive functions are primarily responsible for maintaining ruminative thought 
and distress psychopathologies. For example, research by Whitmer & Gotlib (2013) suggests that 
rumination occurs per increased attentional processes on negative information that impact the 
ability to redirect attention towards other information (i.e., deficits in attentional shifting). 
Similarly, Whitmer & Banich (2010) found that rumination is associated with difficulties 
inhibiting and disengaging from negative material. Finally, work by Zetsche, D’Avanzato, and 
Joormann (2011) suggested that while depression and rumination were associated with poorer 
inhibition, they were not associated with removing irrelevant negative information (i.e., 
updating). Thus, if the findings from these studies are accurate and updating is not associated 
with distress psychopathology or tendencies to ruminate, then perhaps mediation should not have 
occurred, and the results accurately represent these phenomena. However, there are a few 
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problems with this conclusion. First, it has been shown that there are strong relationships 
between the conceptually distinct forms of executive functioning. For example, research by 
Miyake et al. (2000) showed that shifting, inhibition, and updating have strong, positive 
correlations with each other. Further, other research has suggested that updating highly overlaps 
inhibitory functioning, to the point of being almost indistinguishable (Jewsbury, Bowden, & 
Strauss, 2016). Thus, if inhibition or attentional switching were responsible, there would likely 
be notable differences in updating as well. Second, studies such as those conducted by Zetsche, 
D’Avanzato, and Joorman (2011) categorize individuals into either a control group or a group of 
individuals with a DSM diagnosis of depression. These two groups likely do not fully represent 
the entire dimension of distress. As a result, the findings from their study only provide 
information regarding how deficits in executive functioning relate to the categorical 
classification of depression. 
 The findings from the mediation analysis may also be used to support that individuals 
falling at the lower end of the distress dimension do not present with the same biases in updating 
as individuals with DSM diagnoses (i.e., individuals likely on the higher end of the distress 
dimension). No work was found that assessed this possibility. However, there have been many 
studies conducted to investigate potential differences between threshold/subthreshold 
internalizing psychopathologies in the context of functional impairments (Bystritsky, Khalsa, 
Cameron, & Schiffman, 2012). While a model including boundaries between 
subthreshold/threshold psychopathology does not align with a dimensional model, the findings 
may be useful to explain the finding that working memory updating was unrelated to distress 
psychopathology in the present sample. Specifically, results from these studies continue to 
implicate the importance of cognitive styles of thinking. For example, one study found that 
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subthreshold/threshold generalized anxiety disorder can be distinguished by perceived 
controllability of repetitive negative thinking and perceived distress/impairment (Diefenbach et 
al., 2003). As such, this suggests that controllability of repetitive thought may be useful for 
distinguishing between individuals moderate and high on the dimension of distress 
psychopathology. However, no work was found that investigated these differences in the context 
of neurocognitive functioning underlying repetitive thinking. Thus, it is possible that working 
memory updating may only be implicated in more severe distress psychopathologies where a 
greater perceived inability to control ruminative tendencies is associated with poor working 
memory updating. If this is the case, then it is possible that working memory updating may only 
be implicated for individuals falling on the higher end of the distress dimension. Support for this 
notion would require substantial future research encompassing findings from clinical and non-
clinical populations, so that the full range of the dimension could be sampled. Additionally, the 
costs and benefits for patients of using this kind of method to identify the presence of 
psychopathology should be heavily scrutinized.  
 There are also potential explanations for why the results from this study may not 
accurately represent these phenomena. One possibility is that the 3-back task was too cognitively 
taxing to capture differences in neural resource allocation associated with the experimental 
design. Three-back tasks require greater cognitive loads (i.e., cognitive resources) to maintain 
information compared to 2-back or 1-back tasks (Owen, McMillan, Laird, and Bullmore, 2005). 
Further, research has suggested that as cognitive load increases on 3-back tasks, as do P300 
amplitudes. The increase in cognitive load and corresponding P300 amplitudes has been 
suggested to reflect exhaustive serial processing (Watter, Geffen, & Geffen, 2001). During 
exhaustive serial processing, the individual would search all contents of working memory to 
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determine if a stimulus (e.g., a word) matches the stimulus shown three stimuli prior (Garcia-
Marques, Hamilton, & Maddox, 2002). This means that during a 3-back task cognitive processes 
do not stop the search for the answer once identifying the correct answer, but rather do a 
complete search of the entire contents of working memory before coming to a decision. As a 
result, differences in processing negative and neutral words may not have been as apparent as 
they would have been during a 1-back task, as the amount of resources necessary to maintain and 
search through a larger cognitive load is consistently demanding, leading to consistently large 
P300 amplitudes. Thus, it is possible the larger cognitive load leads to less variability associated 
with the experimental manipulations. Some researchers have attempted to address this issue in 
behavioral research by using a 0-back or 1-back version as a control condition (Meule, 2017). 
However, in support that the task was not too difficult, participants in the present sample were, 
on average, 71% accurate in their classifications of words as matching or not matching a word 
shown three words prior. Previous research has suggested that optimal accuracy for classifying 
words as targets/non-targets in a 3-back task is greater than chance (i.e., 50%; Kensinger and 
Corkin, 2003). As such, behavioral data do not support that the task was too difficult in 
comparison to other 3-back tasks. Nevertheless, research has supported that 1-back and 2-back 
tasks are less cognitively taxing as accuracy of these tasks are much higher than 3-backs (~90%; 
Jacola et al., 2014). Thus, simpler n-back tasks may be more useful for measuring resource 
allocation during working memory updating under circumstances requiring less cognitive 
resources.  
 A second possibility is that studies investigating the contributions of working memory 
updating to ruminative thought have not obtained valid measurements of working memory 
updating. As described, behavioral studies do not allow researchers to reliably distinguish 
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between executive functions including inhibition, shifting, and attention. In the present study, 
behavioral data were moderately correlated with neurophysiological data. Specifically, the 
correlation between the accuracy rate and P300 amplitudes was moderate and not significant (r = 
.30, p = .28). Further, the correlation between reaction time and P300 amplitudes was also small-
to-moderate, but also not significant (r = .27, p = .33). These results support that behavioral data 
did not always align well with EEG data. Consequently, it is possible that past research which 
has solely used behavioral measures captured variance contributed by other executive functions, 
such as attentional inhibition or shifting. This possibility is supported by findings from EEG 
studies investigating attentional biases towards negative information in internalizing 
psychopathologies. For example, increased amplitudes of the P100 waveform have been found to 
be associated with biased processing of negative images for those with social phobias (Mueller et 
al., 2009). Similar findings regarding attentional biases for negative information have been 
demonstrated in samples of individuals with major depressive disorder (Dai and Feng, 2011). 
Thus, as previously mentioned, it is possible that processes such as attentional inhibition or 
shifting are more involved in maintaining ruminative thinking compared to updating. One benefit 
of the present study is that because ERP methodology was used, future research may use this 
same data to investigate the possibility that attentional processing is implicated. Specifically, 
ERPs associated with first attending to the stimulus (i.e., 100-300 ms after stimulus onset) may 
provide insight into early processing of negative compared to neutral information.   
Limitations 
 There are also several limitations to this study that may have contributed to the results. 
The first limitation is that the sample size was small (N = 15). As such, is possible that there was 
not enough power to obtain meaningful results. This possibility is supported by the correlational 
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finding between rumination and working memory updating, where although the correlation was 
moderate, no statistical significance was found.  
 A second limitation is that sample was not representative of the target population. 
Namely, although roughly half of participants (7 of the 15 total) were pre-screened to ensure 
endorsement of tendencies to ruminate, participants were not obtained from a clinical sample. 
There are clear disadvantages using undergraduate students as participants in the present 
research. First, although scores on the demoralization measure ranged from 0-24, the mean score 
on the RCd scale for the present sample was 10.67, SD = 2.42. After further reviewing the 
distribution of scores, only 20% of participants had demoralization scores greater than 18. 
Further, there was a small range of rumination scores (possible range from 1-4). Therefore, it is 
plausible that the reason there were not differences observed in resource allocation to negative 
and neutral stimuli relative to distress psychopathology and rumination is because of limited 
participants from an undergraduate sample with high demoralization and rumination scores. 
Second, undergraduate students make up a highly educated sample (Henrich, Heine, & 
Norenzayan, 2010). This is problematic, as education has been demonstrated to be associated 
with better performance on tasks of executive functioning (St. Clair-Thompson & Gathercole, 
2006). Specifically, it has been suggested that better executive functioning is associated with 
stronger performance on tasks of literacy, writing, mathematics, and science (Bull & Lee, 2014). 
Thus, using a sample of participants presently enrolled in higher education greatly limits 
generalizations that can be drawn about executive functioning.  
 A third limitation of the study was the sampling method used. Specifically, because 
participants were only pre-screened during the Fall semester, it is possible that the participants 
obtained from the Fall and Spring semesters represent two entirely different samples. This 
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possibility was supported by the results from the exploratory one-way ANOVA. This analysis 
was used to differences between the two samples on the self-report measures. It was found that 
the sample significantly differed on ruminative thinking, but not demoralization. This is 
problematic for the present research, as the assumption that scores within the sample are 
independent from one another is necessary to provide some sense of consistency in the results. 
However, because the sample was made up of two seemingly different (but highly inter-related) 
groups, it is difficult to say with any amount of certainty that the results are representative. 
Further, the sampling technique limited the ability to obtain participants high in the desired 
constructs, which in turn limits interpretations that can be made about these phenomena in 
clinical samples.   
 In the context of dimensional models of distress psychopathology, the present research 
supports that rumination may be a cross-cutting symptom of distress disorders. Although the 
sample size was small, the substantial relationship between rumination and demoralization 
provides evidence for the relevance of treating cognitive styles of thinking as a feature that 
makes these disorders similar. Further, while the main mediational hypothesis for this study was 
not supported, the methods used provide a framework for future dimensionally-oriented research 
to build on. Namely, future research should investigate relationships between rumination, 
executive functioning, and other spectra of psychopathology. This kind work is important, as it 
may allow for additional connections to be made between disorders that commonly covary with 
mood and anxiety psychopathology outside of the internalizing spectrum (e.g., alcohol use 
disorders; Burns & Teesson, 2002).  
Conclusion 
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 The findings from this study demonstrated that greater tendencies to experience distress 
is strongly associated with greater tendencies to ruminate. The results build on previous research 
by demonstrating that rumination is likely not unique to any one mood or anxiety disorder, but 
rather appears to operate as cross-cutting feature of distress psychopathologies. Rumination and 
features of distress psychopathology were found to be unrelated to resource allocation put forth 
during updating of negative information during working memory updating. Several possibilities 
for this finding are discussed, and all support a need for future research connecting cognitive 
functioning to dimensions of psychopathology. 
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Figure 1: Example series of trials in the n-back task. In this task, words are presented one at a 
time in the center of the screen and participants are instructed to identify whether each word 
matches a word N words back.  
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Figure 2: Histogram of standardized residuals for the dependent variable used to check for 
assumptions of normality. 
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Figure 3: Histogram of scores on the shortened Ruminative Response Scale, the RCd Scale, and 
average P300 amplitudes for negative compared to neutral words.  
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Figure 4: Plot 1 depicts the standardized residuals (x-axis) compared to the dependent variable, 
demoralization (y-axis). Plot 2 depicts the standardized residuals (x-axis) compared to the 
standardized predicted values (y-axis). These plots were used to check assumptions of the 
mediation.  
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Appendix A 
 
Adapted Ruminative Response Scale (McEvoy & Brans, 2013) 
“People think and do many different things when they feel unhappy. Please read each of the 
items below and indicate whether you almost never, sometimes, often, or almost always think or 
do them when you feel unhappy, distressed, or bothered. Please indicate what you generally do, 
not what you think you should do.” 
 (1) almost 
never 
(2) sometimes (3) often (4) almost 
always 
Think, "Why do I 
always react this 
way?" 
❍  ❍  ❍  ❍  
   
 (1) almost never (2) sometimes (3) often (4) almost 
always 
Think about a 
recent situation, 
wishing it had 
gone better 
❍  ❍  ❍  ❍  
 
 (1) almost never (2) sometimes (3) often (4) almost 
always 
Think, "Why do 
I have problems 
other people 
don't have?" 
❍  ❍  ❍  ❍  
 
   
 (1) almost never (2) sometimes (3) often (4) almost 
always 
Go away by 
yourself and 
think about why 
you feel this way 
❍  ❍  ❍  ❍  
 
 (1) almost never (2) sometimes (3) often (4) almost 
always 
Write down what 
you are thinking 
and analyze it 
❍  ❍  ❍  ❍  
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 (1) almost never (2) sometimes (3) often (4) almost 
always 
Go some place 
alone to think 
about your 
feelings 
❍  ❍  ❍  ❍  
 
 (1) almost never (2) sometimes (3) often (4) almost 
always 
Isolate yourself 
and think about 
the reasons why 
you feel sad 
❍  ❍  ❍  ❍  
 
 
 
